An opinion about the Franco-German agreement

Article published in Le Spectateur, n° 31, January 1912.

A popular tale says that Rabbe, having exchanged his horse for Verdier's carriage, was long worried about the justice of such an exchange. Believing he had been robbed, he carefully examined the car and looked for defects. But one day he heard Verdier say of the horse: "That dog...." From then on he was reassured and knew that he had won in the exchange. The day after the Franco-German agreement, public opinion was in similar hesitation. There had been talk, as equally possible things, of the departure of Mr. Lebrun, French Minister of Colonies, and that of Mr. de Lindequist, German Minister of Colonies. Mr. de Lindequist having resigned, current opinion decided that France gained from the treaty and that Germany lost. We have all heard, in a café, in a political meeting: “First of all, I don't know what Morocco is worth. I didn't go there. I only know one thing: the Germans are complaining, and therefore we have cheated them. » We would find, in the French newspapers of November 1911, the reflection of such a state of mind. Here is a recent example, among many others: "The protests which arose in Germany at the time of the publication of the treaty prove abundantly that the interests of France are not harmed, and that on the contrary the taking possession of Morocco brings considerable advantages..." (Le Rappel, December 5, 1911). And we would summarize the reasons for such an opinion as follows: whenever a deal is concluded, one of the two contracting parties gains, the other loses. We can recognize the loser by the fact that he complains, the winner by the fact that he is happy. Whether these reasons are entirely valid can be doubted.

First of all, a market can disappoint without losing: this is the case in which very great advantages were expected from this market; it is then enough for them to be slightly lower than our expectations to give us dissatisfaction - more perhaps than if, expecting little from the market or expecting nothing from it, we found ourselves losing a little. The disappointed are those who get less than they expected and not those who lose more than they were set out to lose. One of the great disappointments seems to be that of the thief who finds the wallet he has just taken empty. Furthermore, once the deal is concluded, each of the contracting parties has an interest in complaining. And it's all the better for him if he complains first - believing himself victorious or defeated, it matters little; he thus prepares for a future revenge. Or, he can highlight his generosity and selflessness. He will be the magnanimous vanquished who accepted humiliation for the love of peace. There is undoubtedly another error in the opinion before us. We too easily imagine the preliminary discussions of an agreement similar to the hesitations of a scale. Mr. Cambon threw a slight advantage into his board and, to restore the balance, Mr. de Kider-len-Waechter threw another advantage into his. At the end of the negotiations, which side did the scales tilt? It would be easy to criticize the excessive role played by the idea of ​​a scale in our conception of an agreement or a market. Two nations can gain from this agreement, they can also both lose. The scales of the fantasy scale can be at their highest or lowest position at the same time. Each nation has its own qualities, its particular method of colonization. It is perhaps from this point of view that it was necessary to envisage the protectorate of France on these Barbary coasts, where the Phoenician, Greek, Roman, Arab and Turkish civilizations have succeeded one another for centuries without having been able to leave a trace of their efforts.

J.P.