I don't know my job

Article published in Le Spectateur, n° 42, January 1913, p. 8-10

Charmide dines at the restaurant. He first asks: "I'm in a hurry. Please bring me the coffee at the same time as the dessert. It would be better if you ordered it right away, for fear of a delay."
Now Charmide, the meal finished, must wait for the coffee. He remarks to the boy: “I asked you though…”
But the boy replies: "Yes, I'm an imbecile, I don't know my job, say it right away", thus ridiculously exaggerating the delicate reproach that Charmides addressed to him.
And Charmide barely recognizes his opinion, thus transformed. But his neighbors at the table think that he has really gone too far, and are already pitying the boy, as he complains himself, through a clever argument of extremes.

We would clarify, by such examples, this ruse of the argument of extremes which consists of distorting an opinion, exaggerating it and pushing it to the limit, so that its very author must now reject it, and feels some shame for having supported it.
— But it is no longer the same opinion, since it is exaggerated and distorted. — No doubt, and yet it also seems that it is, if one can say, "even more the same opinion", that it is her, but more logical, more pure, more complete.

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Charmide's observation: "I asked you to order the coffee in advance" was, in fact, closer to this: "But after all, that is of little importance" than to this: "You are an imbecile". Closer, that is to say that Charmide was much more incapable of pronouncing the second sentence than the first.
However, if we want to distinguish between the two or three possible feelings on the occasion: satisfaction, indifference, discontent of Charmides, it is quite obvious that the remark made testified - just like the caricature presented by the boy's response - of a certain discontent. And therefore this caricature was not so inaccurate.

A teacher said to his student, handing him back his homework: “Here. It’s not too bad.” The student, if he wants to repeat it to his parents, can transform this judgment thus: “He said it was very good”. No doubt he is not repeating the exact words the professor used. At least he is aware that he is sincerely expressing the direction and general meaning of his praise. This is because he considers two orders of possible judgments: what is good; (not bad, good, very good) and what is bad (poor, bad, very bad). And within each category, it seems to him that one can, without great inaccuracy, replace a given expression of the judgment "good" or "bad" by any other.
We would notice, however, when considering the grade earned by the assignment, that 11 or 12 (not bad) is much closer to 8 or 9 (fair, mediocre) than to 17 or 18 (very good).

Thus, the substitution of one word, of one judgment, for another can take place, either within a sentimental class (not bad replaced by very good), or within an intellectual class 11 (not bad ) replaced by 11 (fair ). Now it is the first kind of substitution, the sentimental substitution, that the argument from extremes uses most of the time: it owes its apparent logic and its simplicity to it. If "I had however asked you..." has this value: "(class) discontent (particular nuance) attenuation of discontent by habits of politeness, etc...", it is better to attenuate the essential character, the discontent, at the expense of the politeness which concealed it. And the waiter, responding to Charmide, may have believed that he was only repeating, exactly, the observation received (1).

Jean Paulhan

1 - For the role that words play in similar substitutions, it is useful to consult a note by René Martin-Guelliot. (Le Spectateur. October 1911. Documents). ↩